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ABSTRACT
Given the problematic nature of the introduction of high school students to the Research 
Culture, this paper deals with an analysis of these students’ connections between elements of this 
kind of investigation and elements of an entertaining card game that simulates it – the game of 
Eleusis. As theoretical-methodological axis, we used Bardin’s Content Analysis from the Theory of 
Meaningful Learning perspective. The results point to clear connections between those elements, 
despite some still fragile conceptual constructions. These fi ndings were satisfactory for the problem, 
given the character of an advance organizer of the game for the thematic focus.
Keywords: The game of Eleusis. Heuristics. Scientifi c literacy. Advance organizer.
O jogo de Elêusis: uma simulação lúdica sobre a heurística 
da investigação científi ca
RESUMO
Frente à problemática de inserção de alunos de ensino médio à cultura de investigação 
científi ca, o presente trabalho trata da análise de conexões que tais alunos fi zeram entre elementos 
deste tipo de investigação e elementos de um jogo lúdico de cartas que o simula – o Jogo de Elêusis. 
Para analisar as conexões realizadas pelos alunos, utilizou-se a Análise de Conteúdo de Bardin 
sob a luz da Teoria da Aprendizagem Signifi cativa de Ausubel e Novak. Os resultados acusaram 
conexões claras entre os referidos elementos, apesar de algumas construções conceituais ainda 
frágeis, isto é, ainda não assimiladas devidamente como funcionais. Tais resultados se mostraram 
satisfatórios para com a problemática, tendo em vista o caráter de organizador prévio do Jogo para 
com a temática em foco.
Palavras chave: Jogo de Elêusis. Heurística. Alfabetização Científica. Organizador 
Prévio.
INTRODUCTION
Thinking science in a proper form, i.e. a way of thinking consistent to the consensus 
arising from both the methodological and epistemological academic discussion, relates to 
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the role of science education itself. As the formation of citizens, scientists or not, passes 
through the hands of professionals in this area, facing the stereotypes of Science that 
pervades common sense, in the form of classroom discussions, is an implicit task in the 
act of this education (CUPANI; PIETROCOLA, 2002). Teaching and learning sciences, 
therefore, are actions of breaking with cultural cognitive structures. As Driver et al. say, 
“learning science involves young people entering into a different way of thinking about and 
explaining the natural world” (1994). ‘Different’ because it is often more elaborated and 
uses languages  (like mathematics) that are unusual in the everyday life of many cultures 
(PIETROCOLA, 2002). Therefore, there is a defi nite role to be fulfi lled by the science 
teacher; a rigor at the level of professional scientists, as there is a commitment to training 
future students-citizens (PRAIA; CACHAPUZ; GIL, 2002)! What attitudes should then 
the Science teacher take to enable their students to build themselves a consciousness of 
science as close as possible to the contemporary conceptions? This is our problem.
On the one hand, some authors point out as wrong the teaching of an alleged 
“scientifi c method” as a solution to this problem. Among them, some claim that the 
scientifi c method does not begin with the observation because it is always preceded 
by theories that work as “lenses” to the scientists so that they may have extended 
their perceptions about the phenomena. They also point out that the practice is not a 
logical, algorithmic procedure; otherwise science would be a simple “crank-operated 
contraption” (MOREIRA; OSTERMANN, 1993; VALADARES, 2000). Furthermore, 
they point out that “there is no consensus among philosophers of science on how to better 
understand what scientists do, is building theories or in assessing them” (WOODCOCK, 
2014). As for “The Method” itself, there are still differences regarding the number of 
steps, which one starts or ends the process – or if it, in fact, has an outcome in itself.
From all the provisos outlined here, there is greater clarity on the issue: we must 
seek to build experiences that respect the assertions, in particular, those highlighted 
by the mentioned works.
This paper describes an experience in this line of thinking that uses an entertaining 
game of cards, the Eleusis game. It is a game that is supposed to simulate scientifi c 
practice (CHARLES ROMESBURG, 1979; GARDNER, 1977), not in the stereotyped 
form against which those authors warn, but as a heuristic for the scientifi c practice, in 
line with George Pólya’s How to Solve It book (1945). The game was used aiming that 
the students build parallels between it and the practice as an introduction, as the logic of 
the scientifi c community were not commonplace to them. Therefore, the question that 
guides this research is what are the connections that freshmen students of secondary public 
education make among the elements of the Eleusis game and scientifi c practice?
To analyse these connections, we used Content Analysis (BARDIN, 1977), from 
the perspective of the Educational Psychology of Ausubel and Novak (AUSUBEL; 
NOVAK; HANESIAN, 1968).
Modern heuristic endeavors to understand the process of solving problems […]. 
[A] better understanding of the mental operations typically useful in solving 
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problems could exert some good infl uence on teaching […]. The aim of heuristic 
is to study the methods and rules of discovery and invention. (PÓLYA, 1945, 
p.112, 129–130) 
 
Pólya proposes a classroom heuristic in the form of “procedures (mental operations, 
moves, steps) which are typically useful in solving problems” (1945, p.172). Far from 
going against previous statements, that author points out: “Infallible rules of discovery 
leading to the solution of all possible mathematical problems would be more desirable 
than the philosophers’ stone” (1945, p.172). Thus, the Heuristic speaks of The Scientifi c 
Method as an investigative practice, not as a ‘method,’ as previously discussed. As stated, 
it is in this line that we will work.
Although theoretical or fi eld investigations by students can be proposed, such 
activities may be too advanced for high school freshmen, whose cognitive conceptual 
framework may at fi rst be unsuccessful in communicating in this environment (PRAIA, 
2000). Which the fi rst action to take in this enterprise? We propose the use of a card game 
known as the Eleusis game.
THE GAME OF ELEUSIS
This game, created by Robert Abbott (1963) and especially publicized by Martin 
Gardner (1959, 1977),
[…] allows, through an entertaining experience, the understanding of the model of 
the scientifi c process that has better acceptance among scientists: the formulation 
of a hypothesis testable front of a problem, deducting a possible consequence 
amenable to experimental verifi cation or observation, resulting in confi rming or 
rejecting the hypothesis. (FLORSHEIM; BORGES, 1982, p.46) 
This game is played by essentially two kinds of subjects: a judge and the remaining 
players (or groups of players). The judge formulates a secret rule on how cards can be 
played correctly, which the other players attempt to determine inductively. To this end, 
each group receives a certain number of cards at random, which go one-at-a-time on a 
line of cards (Figure 1). If the card follows the rule, the judge remains inert; if the card 
violates the rule, the judge moves it below the line of cards starting a side-line and the 
player receive more cards as a penalty.
For example, let the secret rule chosen by the judge be “intersperse colours one-
by-one”. If the fi rst card on the table is red (say an ace of hearts), the next group should 
enter a black card; if they put a red card (as another ace of hearts) instead, they will 
observe the judge placing it below the original, concluding that the card was refused. 
Not knowing which the rule is, students may then risk putting another red card (fi ve of 
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diamonds): the judge will put it below the last one. However, after fi nally choosing a 
black card (two of clubs), they will observe the judge showing no reaction – knowing 
thereby that the card was accepted according to the secret rule. This illustrative example 
is shown in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1 – A moment during an example match.
Source: made by the authors.
It is to be noticed that the “intersperse colours one-by-one” pattern follows 
horizontally while subsequently repeated colours go below the line of cards as they violate 
the secretly pre-established rule.
Thus, after initially putting cards at random, as patterns of both errors and correct 
answers develop, players become able to make oral guesses at what is the rule. In the 
case of success, the game ends with the victory of the team. On error, depending if it is 
from logic or negligence, the group is rewarded or punished, respectively.
As this activity has the objective of building parallels with the scientifi c practice and 
making its elements best elucidated (CHARLES ROMESBURG, 1979), our investigative 
question is reinstated here: what are the connections that freshmen students of secondary 
public education make among the elements of the Eleusis game and scientifi c heuristic? 
To analyse such students’ constructions, Ausubel and Novak’s Educational Psychology 
was used.
If analysing connotations deals with analysing meanings that people attach to words 
or phrases, then, when such meanings are given in the classroom, one is interpreting partial 
buildings of individual under development; these buildings themselves are the essence 
of a learning process that is considered meaningful.
According to David Ausubel’s constructivism, meaningful learning is the 
instructional interaction that allows the presentation of new concepts to the learner’s 
cognitive structure in such a way that they become an integral part of this same structure 
Acta Scientiae, v.17, n.3, set./dez. 2015 719
(PRAIA, 2000)1. To this end, “the most important single factor infl uencing learning is 
what the learner already knows” (AUSUBEL; NOVAK; HANESIAN, 1968, p.vi)
Within the context of meaningful learning, there are several metacognitive strategies, 
such as advance organizers and concept maps2, which can catalyze its occurrence. These 
advance organizers are nothing but a didactic material, whose goal is to promote private 
cognitive networks (the students’ cognitive structure) connections with new information 
coming from other cognitive networks (the scientifi c community, for example) through 
a particular network (the teacher). This is an introductory didactic action, which can 
either “awaken” prior knowledge relevant to the topic in cognitive structures or present a 
knowledge that is still unknown to the student audience (MOREIRA; SOUSA; SILVEIRA, 
1982). Therefore, in the practice here described, the Eleusis game can be categorized as 
an advance organizer for scientifi c heuristics.
METHODS
Our investigation is confi gured as an essentially qualitative analysis, considering 
the descriptive character with which we sought to probe meanings present in students’ 
texts. Inferences about quantitative data were not sought: they were used only in search 
of greater clarity of conceptual constructions that individually emerged out of the groups 
(as possible “consensus” of meanings).
Participants in the research were freshmen students at a regular public high school 
in the metropolitan area of the capital of the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul. Only 
two weekly periods were available for the activity, which limited the number of Eleusis 
game matches.
Initially, the teacher presented the rules of the game3, using the same example 
mentioned in the previous section to illustrate it; then the students separated themselves 
into two groups while the teacher acted as judge. The rules are as follows:
a)  If the player’s card violates the secret rule, it will be put below the card with 
which it disagrees (always the last one from the horizontal row) starting a 
sideline; if it conforms to the rule, it will be placed in the ‘mainline’ to the 
right of the last played card. This main rule of the game mechanism aims at 
paralleling with Science observation-phenomenon-reality interaction. Both 
from mistakes as from successes the students should identify patterns for 
building their own rules.
b)  The cards can only be played after group discussion. The pedagogical purpose 
of this rule, added to the ones proposed by Abbott (1963; see also GARDNER, 
1 For a more comprehensive description of David Ausubel’s educational psychology, the reader is referred to his 
book (AUSUBEL; NOVAK; HANESIAN, 1968).
2 For further guidance on other cognitive tools within the context of Ausubel & Novak educational psychology, see 
(NOVAK; GOWIN, 1984).
3 The rules that were actually followed were adapted from (GARDNER, 1977).
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1977), was to inculcate teamwork, which is present in the contemporary 
scientifi c community as a whole. The intention here was to deconstruct the 
stereotype of a “lone scientist”, as pointed out by Woodcock (2014) and 
observed in a survey dialog held as an introduction to these classes’ school 
year. 
c)  The number of cards received after making a regular play varies according to 
the consistency of the card played. The function of this rule was to facilitate 
the parallel between the cards in the player’s hand and an analysis tool, which 
is “enhanced” through the “bonus” resulting from a consistent card play.
d)  Inconsistent plays with a severe lack of observance of the cards on the table 
were punished with the removal of cards from the player’s hand. The purpose 
of this rule is the same as the previous one.
e)  The judge must never give hints about the rule. With this rule, it is intended 
to parallel the judge with Nature, which apparently does not give hints about 
its mechanism; rather, it is inert and indifferent to human knowledge/science. 
Parallelism breaks, of course, at the end of the game when the judge is expected 
to announce that the group “discovered” the rule – an action that is possible 
in the game, but not in Nature, according to current epistemological view 
(CUPANI; PIETROCOLA, 2002).
After conducting the largest possible number of matches, it was proposed to the 
students, arranged in groups from 4 to 7 members, to answer the following single question 
that incited the research activity (Table 1).
TABLE 1 – Sole question in the report.
Analysing the elements and types of players, identify each one of them with the scientifi c practice and 
method, explaining the relationships between them.
a) God and/or Nature
b) Phenomenon
c) Scientist(s)
d) Hypothesis
e) Probing instrument(s)
f) Conclusions/Law.
Source: the authors.
Thus, it was proposed an activity in which students, after the practical interaction 
of the Eleusis game, wrote about connections between the elements of two scenarios: 
the scientifi c practice and the game itself. It was decided to analyse these connections 
via Content Analysis according to Bardin (1977).
Content analysis, according to Bardin, does not refer to a technique in itself, but 
to a variety of investigations aimed at scanning/probing a group of documents (corpus), 
whether written or oral, so that meanings become subjectively explicit to the investigator. 
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It is a scanning of connotations, subjectively expressed or implied in expressions from 
an individual or a collectivity (BARDIN, 1977).
Since the goal was to identify the logical connections between a heuristic model of 
the Scientifi c Method and a card game that simulates it, two reports were excluded from 
a group of 15 reports from four classes4, as they were incomplete. Thus, the corpus of 
this content analysis includes 13 reports from four different classes. It was decided not 
to make assumptions a priori because a phenomenological attitude in the analysis was 
intended (SOUZA, 1999).
The enumeration by mere presence was chosen as analysis technique, but without 
establishing a priori categorizations. The registration units were the connective paragraphs 
(answers to a certain point the question in Table 1) built by the students; the context 
units were the reports as a whole, which related responses to each other. The adopted 
enumeration rule was that of presence. The dimensions of analysis were the points of 
Table 1 themselves, plus two overall dimensions for each point:
• “Relation,” which sustains the connections between elements of scientifi c 
practice with elements of the game, and
• “Argument,” which supports the students’ whys and justifi cations to the 
connections in presented in “Relation.”
Besides these, other dimensions emerged from the analysis of the responses at 
different points.
DISCUSSION
The analysis of students’ connections referring to the item (a) (God and/or Nature) 
allowed for the precise identifi cation of the dimensions set out above “Ratio” and 
“Argument.” It also allowed for the distinction (either implicit or explicit) between the 
concepts “Nature” and “God” as well as their merging – the latter possibly infl uenced 
by the union (“and/or”) between the entries in the text of item (a). Such merging had the 
educational purpose of enabling a free interpretation of this element regardless of the 
teacher’s beliefs and/or student(s), and indeed a few groups distinguished these concepts. 
Due to this fact, relations “Nature-”, “Nature/God-” and “God-” were also counted in 
an aggregated manner simply as “(a)” in the axis/dimension “ratio” as “Relations with 
Judge”. Distinctions were analysed as another dimension. In Table 2 the counting is 
exhibited for more explicit generalities and details.
4 As observed and discussed in the classroom with the students of the group, this incompleteness was caused 
from their lack of motivation in participating in the practice.
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TABLE 2 – Explanation of axes and counts related to the element (a) God and/or nature.
Most frequent relation of element (a): Judge, 11 groups
Most frequent argument in the Relation to Judge:
- Organizes/defi nes/edits/knows/creates/elaborates the 
rule/sequence = 9 groups
More frequent distinction in the Relation to 
Judge:
- God-Nature implicitly = 4
- God-Nature explicitly = 1
Forms of the relation of element 
(a) with Judge:
Arguments of the connection (a) 
with Judge for each different form:
Distinctions of the connection (a) 
with Judge for each different form:
Form 1: God/Nature-Judge = 7 
groups
Arguments of Form 1:
Organizes/defi nes/edits/knows/cre-
ates/elaborates the rule/sequence 
= 5 groups
- Commands the move = 1 group
- Studies what goes on in the game 
= 1 group
[n/a]
Forma 2:
God-Judge = 2 groups
Arguments of Form 2:
- Organizes/defines/edits/knows/
creates/elaborates the rule/se-
quence = 1 group
Not a focus of study = 1 group
- God-Nature explicitly = 1 group
- *God-Nature implicitly = 1 group
Forma 3:
Nature-Judge = 2 groups
Arguments of Form 3:
- Organizes/defines/edits/knows/
creates/elaborates the rule/se-
quence = 1 group
- Centre of the game = 1 group
- Origin of the phenomenon = 1 
group
- Makes the game = 1 group
- God-Nature implicitly = 2 groups
Other relations: 2 groups
Relation to element (a): Arguments for each connection 
with (a):
Distinctions of each connection 
with (a):
Nature with Players = 1 group - Interaction = 1 group - God-Nature implicitly = 1 group
Nature with Cards on the table = 
1 grouP
- Focus of study = 1 group - God-Nature explicitly = 1 group
Source: the authors.
The “Distinction” axis here was built due to the non-fusion “God/Nature” by the 
students. The distinctions, one explicit (group III) and four implicit, can have three 
possible origins not mutually exclusive. The fi rst one would be a student religious 
belief in not fusing similarities between “God” and “Nature”. Another one is the 
assertion raised in class that, by yielding itself to Popper’s principle of falsifi ability, the 
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existence of God is not treatable by Science. Finally, the didactic addiction, explained 
by (AUSUBEL; NOVAK; HANESIAN, 1968), that teachers traditionally impinge 
automatic/mechanical learning by requiring verbatim transcripts of whole words or 
propositions.
Furthermore, the analysis of this element also made explicit that the majority (9/13 
or 69.2%) associated God/Nature to Judge from both entities transcending the game 
itself.
On the other hand, the analytical reading concerning the item (b) (“Phenomenon”) 
shows marks of:
a)  A conceptual shock about the signifier “Phenomenon”: the scientific 
denotation of the entry “phenomenon”, although intrinsically complex (given 
the magnitude and depth of study that Phenomenology requires), in simplifi ed 
terms, is “that which manifests itself,” a noun/object, therefore. However, 
there is a common connotation assigned to the entry in question as “what 
stands out”, as it is attributed to sports or musical celebrities. Although the 
close relationship between scientifi c connotation and denotation, it was found 
to be close enough to cause said shock.
b)  The still restricted construction of the meaning of “Phenomenon”: the great 
depreciation is justifi ed by the lack of arguments on the relationship (or on 
itself) in the connections made by some groups.
When making explicit these two points, it is understood to mean another mark of 
the analysis of this element (when looking comprehensively at all exhibits/connections). 
It is the mark of the distinct plurality between connections and even between arguments, 
which, from our point of view, annulled any general categorization/scaling, both on the 
“Relationship” axis and, especially, in the “Argument” axis, which is why it was decided 
not to build any categorization table. 
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TABLE 3 – Explanation of the axes and related counts to the element (c) (“Scientist”).
Most frequent relation of element (c): Player(s)/participant(s), 12 groups
Arguments referring to the connection of (c) with 
“Player(s)”
Actions referring to the connection of (c) com 
“Player(s) /participant(s)” in general
Arguments referring to rule/conclusion: 8 groups
- Discover/fi nd the rule/sequence/formula/answer = 6 
groups
- Arrive at/give conclusions = 2 groups
- Arrive at/discover/fi nd the rule/answer/sequence/
conclusion = 4 groups
- Edit/elaborate hypothesis/play = 2 groups
- Know the essence of the game/discover what the 
judge thinks = 1 group
Arguments referring to play/hypothesis: 6 groups
- Test/crate/study/propose/discover hypothesis(es) = 
4 groups
- Guess/play/dictate actions/plays = 2 groups
Arguments referring to the analysis in itself: 3 groups
- Study the cards = 2 groups
- Analyse/study the game = 1 group
Arguments referring to the involvement process-
subject: 1 group:
- Infl uence themselves by the problem = 1 group
Other relations of the element (c): 1 group
Alternatively relation: Referent argument: Referent action:
Law = 1 group Organizes hypothesis + prevision + 
experience
[No f inal i ty  denotat ion or 
connotation].
Source: elaborated by the authors.
The obviousness mentioned above is quantifi ed by the 12 groups (92.3%) who 
have connected Scientist-Player; of these, 8 (66.7%) evoked argument concerning the 
rule or conclusion and 6 of the 12 (50.0%) the play/hypothesis. The construction of the 
dimension/axis “Actions” appears in 7 of the 12 connections/reports (58.3%). 4 of them 
refer to the “end as an end in itself” (i.e., looking at the completion/rule as an end in 
itself); 2 of the 7 speak of the objectifi cation of the process itself when mentioning the 
construction of the hypothesis/play as an end to be achieved; and only one group writes 
about uncover/discover.
The analysis of the item d) (“Hypothesis”) is marked by the relation hypothesis- play 
and by the lack of arguments to explain the relation in some reports. In Table 4, scores of 
the two dimensions numerically more observable in that table are made explicit. Notice 
that the distinction between the entries chosen to express the connection is required 
through the axis “Argument.”
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TABLE 4 – Explanation of the axes and counts related to the element (d) (“Hypothesis”).
Relations with the element (d) Argument of each relation
Relation 1: argued under evocation of rigor/
coherence = 4 groups
- Guess = 2 groups
- Logical play/judgment/opinion = 1 group
- Suggestion = 1 group
- Take a right conclusion = 2 groups
- Has precise ground = 1 group
- [Maturable mutability] = 1 group
- Reasoning test [right+wrong] = 1 group
Relation 2: argued as “attempt to discover”= 2 
groups
- Guess = 1 group
- Opinion = 1 group
- Attempt to discovery/unveiling = 2 groups
Relations without argumentation = 7 groups
- Guess/opinion/ what is thought = 4 groups
- Play/attempt/play = 3 groups
Source: The authors.
With the categorizations of postings described in Table 4, it is noted that relations 
that expressed argument on accuracy/logical consistency make up 4 from the 13 reports 
(30.8%); of these, half (2/13 or 15.4%) of accounting was found with argument alleging 
attempted unveiling. It was also noted the absence of argument/explanation in 7 of the 
13 reports (53.8%), although they have connected entities of scientifi c practice with the 
game. Above all, it is noted that all the answers referred to the logical expression of the 
player towards the answer.
The content analysis of item (e) (“Probing Instrument”) allows the emergence of a 
dichotomic dimension of the distinction (or not) between “cards in hand” and “cards on 
the table.” It also emerges the relational unanimity among the entities “Instrument” and 
“cards” and the uniqueness of the group IX in indirectly identifying the sense and reason 
as an instrument. Table 5 accounts and clarifi es a few details.
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TABLE 5 – Explanation of axes and counts related to the element (e) Probing instrument.
Most frequent relation of element (e): Cards = 13 groups (unanimous)
Arguments used in the relation:
That with what one thinks = 6 (*)
That with one interacts/operates = 3 (**)
Without arguments (or unfathomable /vague) = 4 (***)
Forms of the relation with the cards: Arguments used in each form of relation:
(the number of asterisks refers to how these 
arguments nested under the previous thread count)
Form 1: with the cards in hand = 6 groups ** - one interacts with: 2 groups
* - helps the discovery: 1 group
** - [subject to operation]: 1 group
*** - important component: 1 group 
*** - none: 1 group
Form 2: with the cards indistinctly = 6 groups * - through which one draws conclusions: 2 groups
* - helps to discover [essence] of the game: 1 group
* - is analysed with: 1 group
* - with which we discover the rule: 1 group
*** - none: 1 group
Forma 3: cards on table = 1 group *** - research material: 1 group
Relation with sense and reason: 1 group
Argument used in the relation: is analysed with
 Source: The authors.
From this unanimity, 6 (46.1%) described the instrument as “that with what you 
think”, 3 (23.1%) “that with you interacts/operates”, and 4 do not use arguments or use 
vague ones (30.8%).
Finally, concerning the element (f) (“Conclusion/Law “), there is a lack of relation 
to any element of the game (4/13 or 30.8%) or argument to sustain the relation (5 out of 
9 who did, or 55.6%) – totalling 9 of 13 reports (69.2%) without argument. The counts 
are shown in Table 5 and inferences about the connections made by the students soon 
after it.
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TABLE 6 – Explanation of axes and counts related to the element (f) Conclusion/Law.
Most frequent relation of element (f): conclusion of an undertaking = 7 groups
Indicator of the relation with conclusion of 
undertaking
Arguments used in the relation: 
(independently of form)
Form 1: Rule/grasp the rule = 5 groups
Form 2: Right answer/verdict of the judge = 2 groups
Form 3: What is hidden in the sequence = 1 [This report 
also relates to “hit”].
- [Non-existent/unfathomable] = 5 groups
- One arrives at it through guess/hypothesis = 1 
group
- One tries to discover/decipher it = 1 group
Other relations with element (f): 2 groups
Other forms of relation with element (f): Arguments referring to each form:
Form 1: With f inal  and combined thinking 
(“environmental/contextual” element to the game) = 
1 group
[None]
Form 2: Play that follows pattern = 1 group Follows game pattern.
Absence of relations with element (f): 4 groups
Lack of argument = 9 groups, of which
- together with the absence of relation = 4 groups
- together with any relation = 5 groups
 Source: The authors.
From Table 6, one also reads that 7 of the 13 reports (53.8%) connected “Conclusion” 
to “conclusion of the undertaking” (game-research). However, 4 out of the 7 had no 
argument and 1 did not let clear his explanation (adding up to 5/7 or 71.4%).
Above all, there was no reference signal to the understanding that there is no effective 
end game, even if having been some matches, in all classes, in which no group deduced 
the rule, despite coherent suggestions that could have built it.
As inferences have been made before, in this section, they will be in summary form 
to facilitate discussions with other investigative probes with students about the Nature 
of Science theme.
First, the analysis of the connections made with the element (a) explained that 
the majority (9/13 or 69.2%) associated “God/Nature” to “Judge” because both entities 
transcend the game itself: the Judge performs actions above the players, they do not have 
access to nor can replicate them (organizes/defi nes/says/knows/creates/produces the rule). 
The analysis of the element (b) indicates that 12 groups (92.3%) connected Scientist to 
the Player, and 8/12 (66.7% of them) on the grounds for the rule or conclusion and 6/12 
(50.0 %) to play/hypothesis, i.e., cognitive/logical-mental actions. Taking this data as 
private premises, associated with the general one that transcendence is not proper to the 
human being, it can be deduced that it has been built in these students the understanding 
that science is above all human (while not transcendent work) and, therefore, faulty and 
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developable because the “rules of nature” are apart from the knowledge of scientists 
(players).
A second point that stands out from the analysis is the diffuse characteristic of 
the connections built in element (b) (“Phenomenon”). Two interpretations of such 
diffuse character showed up: the conceptual shock on the signifi er “phenomenon” and 
the restricted construction of its scientifi c signifi cance, given the absence of proposed 
connection. This points both the failure of the presentations that preceded the game about 
the construction of this concept, the importance of such presentations as a basis for the 
connections to be made during the game.
Still another point on the element “Scientist” is explicit. In its analysis, the dimension 
“Objectives” (of the scientist) had 7 goals of the practice. 4 of them point to a look of 
“conclusion/rule” as an end in itself while the other 2 refer to the objectifi cation of the 
process itself when they mention the construction of the hypothesis/bid as a goal to be 
achieved. These six groups that exhibited such purposes allow us to realize the closed 
character of scientifi c research with which the students conceived it after the game, an 
implicit point against it in its simulation function of the scientifi c method.
In analysing the responses for the “Hypothesis” element, it was noted that the 
relations that expressed argumentation on accuracy/logical consistency added up to 4 
from the 13 (30.8%); in half of them it was found arguments alleging “an attempt to the 
unveiling.” The fi rst mentioned form of argumentation may point to a clear understanding 
of the need for some rigor in the construction of reasoning; the second, in turn, may 
indicate the understanding of scientifi c cognitive practice (hypothesis) as “rational effort/
action of research.” It was also noted the absence of argument/explanation 7 reports 
(53.8%), although they have connected entities of scientifi c practice with the game. The 
lack of argument may come from a still vague conceptual construction of the student (a 
connotation, therefore): a vague understanding of the scientifi c idea of  ‘hypothesis’ (a 
denotation) precluded any argument that supports the presented relationship; this argument 
could not be induced, however, any association with the concept that the students have 
about the terms chosen to build the connection, such as guess, play, and opinion. Thus, 
the lack of reasoning must be a sign of the idea of  “hypothesis” not having being properly 
assimilated to the cognitive structure, that is, such an idea was not appropriated by students 
as a functional/useful concept (AUSUBEL; NOVAK; HANESIAN, 1968).
It also emerges from the analysis the connective unanimity between the entities 
“Instrument” and “Cards” and the singularity of the group IX in indirectly identifying the 
sense and reason as tools. This unanimity, however, indicates a slightly different relation 
to the instrument: “think with” and “operate with” a cognitive and motor dichotomy. 
However, the fact that the 4 groups that do not use arguments, or are vague in formulating 
them, may come from the little contact that these students generally had with the theme, 
which could be read from interactions with them later on this investigation.
As a fi nal point, the element (f) “Conclusion”, reading points out, in some reports, 
its interpretation as that typical of schoolwork, such as “with this work I learned that ...” 
rather than of the scientifi c practice and the game. It is also noted the lack, sometimes 
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of any element of the game (4/13 or 30.8%), sometimes of arguments that sustain the 
established relation (5 of 9 who did, or 55.6%) − a total of 9 of 13 reports (69.2%) 
without argument. The origin of these absences may lie in the highlighted confusion, or 
in the same possible sources of the element “Hypothesis,” namely in the vague concept 
construction-connotative of “Conclusion” and/or “Law” or in a collective consensus 
obviousness of what it/they is (are).
Finally, in Table 5 one reads that 53.8% connected the “Conclusion” element to 
“fi nalizing the game/research”; of which 71.4% had no argument or not made clear their 
explanation. The group that got “Conclusion” as a “fi nal thought and set” may have 
explained the fi xation that science is a collective enterprise.
Above all, in general, the inferences made on the reports point to clear connections 
between some elements: “Scientist” and “Player” (92%), “God/Nature” and “Judge” 
(84%), “Probing Instrument” and “Cards” (100%). The minutiae (here omitted) of 
these general data allow one to induce that some groups (69%) understood Nature as 
transcending the scientists, a relevant epistemological relationship. Furthermore, it became 
remarkable the identifi cation of “Probing Instruments” as a cognitive tool “that which it 
thinks with” (46%) and “which they interact with” (23%).
However, the data also allowed us to verify that the conceptual construction was 
carried unstable for some signifi cant. The “Hypothesis” element, for example, although 
all (100%) designing it as a logical expression toward the answer, the majority (54%) was 
unable to argue about it. The analysis of signifi cant connections with the “Phenomenon”, 
in turn, did not generate data that would allow categorizations (the answers were rather 
singular). These results, however, were expected, according to Ausubel and Novak’s 
Educational Psychology.
Meaningful learning is a complex process that requires life span invested in several 
interactions to feed the cognitive structure; meaningful learning does not occur, it is 
occurring (MOREIRA, 2005). With the Eleusis game working as a previous organizer, 
the concepts “hypothesis” and “phenomenon”, being new to most students (as found 
in previous dialogues to practice), have not had adequate livingness for stabilization in 
the cognitive network. It is worth remembering that school actions are the sum of the 
few, limited and perhaps unique experiences that some students have in contact with 
the scientifi c practice. These concepts, even if observed fragile at that moment, became 
useful information for later didactic teacher action.
As for the problems observed during the teaching experience, it should be 
highlighted the short time available to students to play (about a maximum of four periods 
distributed in two weeks) and the big groups formed to play. Both problems are related: 
a low persistence in keeping the focus on activity on the part of some students was a 
vehicle to the dispersion of the waste of available time in extracurricular chats or even the 
use of the cards for other games. The small development of argumentative skill is also a 
point against at the time of evaluation: connections or arguments left blank inhibited the 
teacher of a more accurate analysis, much the “written silence” can point to educational 
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failure. It is strongly recommended that the problems identifi ed to be taken into account 
in future activities.
After all, it was considered that the practice was successful as a previous organizer 
of scientifi c research heuristic considering the meanings identifi ed in the analysis.
CONCLUSION
In connection with our initial problem of students’ insertion in the scientifi c and 
investigative heuristics, and our guiding question about the connections that these students 
would make between elements of heuristics and elements of Eleusis game, the results were 
satisfactory. Those connections were identifi ed as clear and consensual by a signifi cant 
proportion of students, and the fragile quality of certain concepts is understandable when 
taking into account the prerequisite of cognitive structures of students.
These results allow us to realize the closed character of scientifi c research with 
which the students conceived it after the game, an implicit point against it in its simulation 
function of the scientifi c method.
As for the problems of time available to students, the size of the groups formed 
to play and the weak development of argumentative skills, we recommend that they are 
taken into account in future activities.
It is emphasized, again, the character (I) introductory and (II) heuristic of Eleusis 
game, so that there is neither didactic frustrations face the restricted connections that 
arise nor confi rmations of harmful stereotypes to the students scientifi c training. It is 
recommended too (as was later done with the students) that such practice be succeeded by 
real problems of investigations so that skills and expertise concerning scientifi c practice 
are adequately developed.
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